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Previous research on public-private wage differentials in Australia is scarce and has 
focused on the central parts of the conditional wage distribution. Using the first six 
waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, 
this study applies quantile regression models to examine whether the sectoral wage 
effect varies along the wage distribution. For females, we find public sector wage 
premiums for almost the entire wage distribution and the premiums are relatively 
stable except at the extremities of the distribution. For males, the premiums decrease 
monotonically and are negative for the top half of the conditional wage distribution. 
The decomposition results show that the observed differences in individuals and job 
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There are many reasons why public and private sectors workers can be paid 
differently. First, public sector could set wages in a non-competitive way due to the 
monopolistic power of governments in setting prices and taxes for the provision of 
public services (Reder 1975). Second, public sector may be driven by objectives such 
as vote and/or budget maximisation rather than profit maximisation. Wages in public 
sector may also be used to achieve other considerations such as equity and fairness. 
Third, the institutional environment for wage setting may differ between public and 
private sectors. For example, there could be an imperfect labour market in the public 
sector. Union density is often higher in the public sector than in the private sector. 
Consequently, union may have a stronger bargaining power in securing higher wages 
for public sector employees in a collective bargaining industrial framework. Fourth, 
productivity-related characteristics of employees in the two sectors may be different. 
If public sector employees are relatively skilled, they require higher remunerations.  
Study of public-private pay gap has important policy implications on a wide range of 
labour market issues. For example, higher wages to public sector employees may 
justify outsourcing of some government functions to private sector, and may 
potentially crowd out recruitment effort of private sector, forcing it to raise wages in 
order to compete for employees in the labour market. 
Earlier studies on the public-private wage differentials mostly focus on the mean of 
the wage distribution. International evidence suggests that, relative to private sector, 
on average there is a wage premium for public sector (between 3 to 11 per cent) and 
the premium is often found to be higher for females than for males (See Borland and 
Gregory (1999) for a detailed review).
1  Recently, quantile regressions have been 
increasingly used to examine whether the public-private earnings differentials vary 
along the earnings distribution. The volume of this literature includes, for instance, 
Melly (2002) on Germany; Poterba and Rueben (1994) on the U.S.; Mueller (1998) on 
Canada; and Blackaby et al. (1999) on the U.K.; Lucifora and Meurs (2006) on Italy, 
France and the U.K.; Bonjour (1999) on Switzerland. Typically, these studies find 
lower pay dispersion in the public sector. Also, they find that public sector employees 
at the lower end of the wage distribution enjoy a wage premium relative to private 
                                                 
1 However, Adamchik and Bedi (2000) find a private sector wage advantage in Poland. 2 
 
sector employees; but the reverse holds for employees at the upper end of the wage 
distribution. In addition, female public sector employees are often found to enjoy a 
premium across almost the entire wage distribution; while male employees in the 
public sector suffer wage penalty over a large part of the wage distribution.  
Only a few studies have examined public-private earnings differentials in Australia. 
Among the few, they give conflicting evidence about whether the observed earnings 
differentials are attributable to the sectoral effect. For instance, using the 1993 
Training and Education Experience Survey collected by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Borland et al. (1998) show that, relative to full-time private sector 
employees, the average weekly earnings of full-time public sector employees were 10 
to 15 per cent higher for males and 20 to 25 per cent higher for females. However, 
they find that the differentials can all be explained by observed differences in 
productivity-related individual and job characteristics, suggesting there is no sectoral 
effect for Australian workers. On the other hand, using the 1985 Australian 
Longitudinal Survey data, Vella (1993) finds a significant wage premium for young 
female government employees aged 15 to 26 years relative to their private sector 
counterparts even after controlling for observed heterogeneity.  
The Australian public sector has gone through significant reform and its size, 
measured in terms of employment, has reduced significantly since mid-1980s. The 
employment share of the public sector (including commonwealth, state/territory, and 
local governments) has dropped from 25.4 per cent in 1985 to about 16 per cent in 
2005 (Krvger 2006). It is a result of a combination of privatisation, outsourcing, 
reduction of permanent employment, increase in part-time, causal and contract 
employment, and technological changes. Among the OECD countries, Australia and 
the U.K. are the only two countries that have significantly reduced the share of public 
sector. The public sector size in Australia is much smaller than other OECD countries 
such as Sweden and Denmark (over 30 per cent in 1998) (Jürges 2002), and the U.K. 
(about 20 per cent in 2005). Nonetheless, the Australian government remains a major 
employer, with over 1.3 million employees in 2006, approximately 18 per cent of the 
workforce (Industry Skills Councils 2006).  
Australia has also been undergoing significant changes in industrial relations since the 
early 1990s.  Through a ruling of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, the 
Australian wage setting started to shift from industry-based awards towards 3 
 
enterprise-based (or workplace-based) agreements (Waddoups 2005). The 
introduction of the Workplace Relations Act (WRA) in 1996 further legitimised this 
practice. As a result of the WRA, the proportion of workers covered by the traditional 
award system has fallen dramatically. For example, in May 2000 only 23.2 per cent of 
employees were paid under an award compared to 67.6 per cent in May 1990 
(Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 2002).
2  Reflecting  these 
industrial relations reforms, the Public Service Act 1999 provides the most significant 
and extensive deregulation. For instance, it gives agency heads direct power to 
manage staff using merit principle to maximise agency performance, shifting the 
focus to individual agency for wage determinations (Australian Public Service 
Commission 2003).  
This study contributes to the Australian literature on public-private pay gap in two 
ways. First, we examine wage differentials in a changed industrial relations 
environment where decentralised wages settings are more extensive than in the period 
covered by previous studies. We expect that the new industrial relations system may 
lead to differential sectoral effects across the conditional wage distribution. The 
experience of the U.K. suggests that decentralisation in wage setting and higher 
employer’s autonomy in wage determination have contributed larger public-private 
wage differences especially in the lower part of the wage distribution (Bender and 
Elliott 1999; Blackaby et al. 1999; and Disney and Gosling 2003). Focusing on public 
sector alone, Bender (2003) finds that the pay distribution has narrowed at the low end 
but has widened at the upper end after the first round of enterprise bargaining in 
Australia. As a result, pay inequality in the public sector has grown. This would have 
implications on the wage differentials between public and private sector workers. 
Second, using quantile regression models, we examine how the wage gap varies 
across the conditional wage distribution rather than only estimate the gap at the mean 
as earlier Australian studies did. The results from quantile regressions would provide 
a more complete description of the sectoral wage differentials.  
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes quantile regression 
models and the semi-parametric decomposition method. Section 3 discusses the data 
                                                 
2 In May 2000, 35.2 per cent of employees were on registered collective agreements, 1.5 per cent on 
unregistered collective agreements, and 40 per cent were covered by individual agreements 
(Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 2002). 4 
 
source and model specification. Section 4 presents estimation results. Finally, in 
Section 5, we set out our conclusions. 
2. Method 
2.1 Quantile regression 
To investigate whether the public-private pay gap vary at different points of the 
conditional wage distribution, we employ the quantile regression models of Koenker 
and Bassett (1978). Following Buchinsky (1998), we specify the 
th θ  ( 01 θ <<) 
conditional quantile of the distribution of the (log) wage w, conditional on a vector of 
covariates x, as  
(1) ( | ) ( ) Qwx x θ β θ = .  
Equation (1) assumes a linear relationship between the population conditional quantile 
of w, ( | ) Qwx θ , and the covariates x. For a random sample of ( , ii wx ) for  1,..., iN = , 
equation (1) implies 
(2) ()
i ii wx θ β θε =+ , with  ( | )
i Qx θθ ε =0, 
where 
i θ ε   is the error term of the 
th θ conditional (on xi) quantile. In quantile 
regressions the only distributional assumption on 
i θ ε   is that the 
th θ  conditional (on xi) 
quantile of the error term equals zero. 
For a given (0,1) θ ∈ ,  () β θ  can be estimated by  
(3) 
1






β θβ θ β
=
=− − ≤ ∑  
where 1() ⋅ is the indicator function (Koenker and Bassett 1978).  ( ) β θ  is estimated 
separately for each (0,1) θ ∈ .  
Following the tradition, we first estimate a single equation quantile regression model 
of the form similar to equation (2),  
(2’) ( ) ( )
i ii i wP x θ α θβ θ ε =++ , with  ( | , )
i ii QP x θθ ε =0, 
where Pi is a dummy variable equals to one if individual i works in public sector and 
zero otherwise; xi is a vector of other variables that are expected to affect wages, such 
as education and experience. The quantile regression coefficients can be interpreted as 5 
 
the rates of return to the respective characteristics at the specific quantile of the 
conditional wage distribution (Buchinsky 1998; Koenker 2005). Therefore,  ( ) α θ  
measures the public sector wage premium (or penalty if it is negative) at the 
th θ  
conditional quantile of wages and  ( ) β θ  measures the effect of other variables at that 
point of the conditional wage distribution. If the public sector wage premium is the 
same across the conditional wage distribution, we would expect  ( ) α θ  not to vary for 
different θ s. On the other hand, if being a public sector employee has no effect on 
wages, then  () α θ  should not be significantly different from zero for anyθ . 
The single equation model in equation (2’) assumes that the wage determination 
process is identical for both public and private sector workers. However, test results 
shown later suggest that the assumption is violated: the wage determinants affect 
public and private workers differently. To account for the differences in the returns to 
wage determining factors between public and private sector workers, separate wage 
equations for each group are required. As in the OLS framework, after estimating the 
wage equation separately for public and private sector workers using quantile 
regressions, the differences at various quantiles of the wage distributions between the 
two groups of workers can be decomposed into the difference due to observed 
characteristics and the difference in returns to those characteristics. 
2.2 Decomposition in quantile regression 
A decomposition method for quantile regression models was initially developed by 
Machado and Mata (2005). Here we use a modified procedure proposed by Melly 
(2005) and Autor et al. (2005). In the modified procedure, instead of randomly 
drawing θ  and  x, we simply estimate quantile regressions for a large number of 
selected θ s, such as 12 , ,..., J θ θθ , and use the observed sample x to form required 
marginal distributions of wages. In summary, the following steps are involved in 
decomposing the wage gap between public and private sector workers at different 
points of the wage distributions. 
Step 1: Estimate  ()
p
j β τ  and  ()
n
j β τ , for  (0,1) j τ ∈  and  1,..., jJ = , using the public 
sector workers and private sector workers respectively, to form  11 {( ) } }
p N pp J
ij j i x βτ ==   and 
11 {{ ( )} }
p N pn J
ij j i x βτ == , where 
p




i x  refers to the observed characteristics of private sector worker i; Np and 
Nn refer to the numbers of public and private sector workers respectively. 
11 {( ) } }
p N pp J
ij j i x βτ ==   provide the predicted wage density of public sector employees; 
11 {{ ( )} }
p N pn J
ij j i x βτ ==  provide the counterfactual wage density of public sector workers 
that would arise if they retained their own characteristics but were paid as private 
sector workers. 
Step 2: Estimate the 
th θ quantile of the sample 11 {( ) } }
p N pp J
ij j i x βτ = = , denoted as 
(, ( ) )
pp Qx θ β τ , and of the sample 11 {{ ( )} }
p N pn J
ij j i x βτ = = , denoted as ( , ( ))
pn Qx θ β τ . 
Step 3: Obtain   (, ( ) )
pp Qx θ β τ -  (, ( ) )
pn Qx θ β τ . This difference represents the wage 
gap attributable to the differences in the returns to observed characteristics at the 
th θ  
quantile, i.e. the public sector wage effects.
3 
To estimate the standard errors and confidence intervals of the sectoral wage effects, 
the bootstrap method can be used to replicate the above procedure. In this study 100 
replications are carried out to estimate the confidence intervals and repeated 
observations for the same person in different waves (i.e. clustering) are taken into 
account in re-sampling. 
3. Data and model specification 
3.1 Data source 
The empirical analysis is based on the first six waves (2001–2006) of the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The survey is a national 
household panel survey focusing on families, income, employment and well-being.
4 
The first wave was conducted between August and December 2001. Then, 7683 
households representing 66 per cent of all in-scope households were interviewed, 
generating a sample of 15,127 persons 15 years or older and eligible for interview. Of 
them, 13,969 were successfully interviewed. Subsequent interviews for later waves 
were conducted about one year apart. 
                                                 
3 An alternative decomposition using  (, ( ) )
np Qx θ β τ  and  (, ( ) )
nn Qx θ β τ  shows a similar result. 
4 Detailed documentation of the survey is in Wooden, Freidin and Watson (2002). 7 
 
The HILDA survey contains detailed information on individuals’ current labour 
market activity including labour force status, earnings and hours worked, and 
employment and unemployment history. For those employed, information on job 
characteristics, such as the size of the workplace and the industry to which the 
employee belongs is also collected. The wages used in this study refer to hourly 
wages derived from pre-tax total weekly earnings and hours worked in the main job.
5,6 
To avoid the effect of irregular reporting of weekly earnings and hours worked, we 
excluded those whose hourly wage rate is less than $5. One comparative advantage of 
HILDA is that the earnings data are not grouped, thus avoiding possible measurement 
error due to grouped data. To increase the sample size and thus the accuracy of the 
estimated distribution, we pool the six waves of HILDA survey currently available. 
Wages are deflated to the first quarter of 2001 using quarterly wage growth rates for 
males and females separately. Another reason for pooling the data is that sufficiently 
large sample sizes are important in bootstrapping the standard errors of the 
decomposition results.
7 Pooling six waves of HILDA raises two econometric issues. 
One relates to repeated observations, as most individuals are surveyed more than once. 
The other is an increase in real wages over time. We include year dummies and use 
bootstrap methods that account for clustering in the empirical work to address these 
issues. 
Our sample includes those wage earners who worked in non-agricultural industries. It 
includes males aged between 25 and 64 (inclusive) years and females aged 25 to 61 
(inclusive) years. Full-time students are excluded. There are 18,570 individuals: 9,713 
males and 9,257 females. About 22 per cent of males and 33 per cent of females in the 
samples are public sector employees. The summary statistics of the samples are 
presented in the appendix Table A1. 
                                                 
5 We use hourly wages in this study to avoid complications arising from the potential effects of unions 
on hours worked (Andrews et al. 1998). 
6 Using hourly wages in all jobs produces virtually the same results. 
7  The bootstrapping method is difficult to carry out if the sample size is too small. It is because 
sampling draws did not always contain observations that had the characteristics used in the model if 
only one wave data were used. For example, since only a few private workers are indigenous in any 
one wave, a redrawn private worker sample may not have an indigenous worker. As a result, the 
original model that includes indigenous status as a covariate cannot be estimated using this redrawn 
sample. While STATA goes ahead to estimate βs by automatically dropping these variables, the 
number of variables for public and private samples, x
p
 and x
n respectively, will no longer be the same. 
As a result, one could not calculate the counterfactual wages of public sector employees in 
bootstrapping, since x
pβ
n becomes unconformable. Pooling the six waves of data helps to avoid the 
problem. 8 
 
3.2 Distribution of wages 
To have a better grasp of the wage distribution across sectors, we estimate the wage 
density using the kernel estimator and present the results in Figure 1. For both males 
and females, wages in the public sector appear to have a higher mean than in the 
private sector. For males the dispersion of wages in the private sector appears to be 



















Figure 1: Distribution of wages in the public and private sectors by sex
 
 
Figure 2 shows the raw wage gap between public and private sectors at different 
percentiles and at the mean. On average, (log) wages of male workers in the public 
sector are 15 percentage points higher than male workers in the private sector; female 
workers in the public sector have a wage 19 percentage points higher. These mean 
wage gaps are in line with that found in Borland et al (1998). Clearly, the gap is not 
uniform across the wage distribution. For males, the gap decreases from the bottom up 
to the 15
th quantile; it then increases until to the 23
th quantile and becomes relatively 
flat up to the 40
th quantile. After that it falls monotonically. The gap for females 
increases initially and then falls until to the 12
th quantile; from the 13
th quantile the 
gap increases up to about the 60
th quantile and thereafter falls monotonically. For 
males the gap is positive from the bottom up to about the 88
th quantile of the wage 9 
 
distribution; for females, the gap is positive for almost the entire wage distribution. 
The variation of the wage gap along the wage distribution provides a case for using 
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3.2 Model Specification 
The specification of the wage equation is an extension of the standard Mincer model 
of wage determination (Mincer 1974). Essential to his model are human capital 
variables. Therefore we include in the wage equation four education dummies (degree, 
other post-school qualification, year 12, and year 11 and below), work experience 
(lifetime employment and its square) and a dummy on whether one has long-term 
health conditions (representing health capital). In addition to human capital, variables 
on the following characteristics are also included in the model: demographic 
characteristics (three dummies for whether one is born in Australia, an immigrant 
from an English speaking or an immigrant from a non-English speaking country; a 
race dummy to identify whether an individual is an Aborigine or Torres Strait Islander; 
and a marital status dummy); and employment characteristics (three dummies to 
identify casual, part-time or full-time employment); and three occupation dummies for 10 
 
white-collar workers (managers and professionals), other white-collar workers and 
blue-collar workers. To control for heterogeneity of local labour markets and the 
differential effects of regional living costs on wages, we also include six state 
dummies and a dummy indicating capital city residence. There are six dummies to 
identify workplace size ranging from less than 20 to over 500 employees. The positive 
relationship between workplace size and wages is well documented (Idson and Feaster 
1990; Morissette 1993; Miller and Mulvey 1996). Increasing monitoring costs (which 
result in higher wages according to efficiency wage theories), greater importance of 
workplace-specific human capital and teamwork are some explanations discussed in 
the literature. A union membership dummy variable is used to capture the union wage 
effect. A positive relationship between union membership and wages is often found in 
the literature. Finally, year dummies are included to control for the trend of increasing 
real wages over the six waves of the HILDA data.  
Summary statistics for the variables used are presented in appendix Table A1. The 
sample means reveal very little that is not already well known. For instance, public 
sector employees enjoy higher wages; larger workplaces (generally) have a higher 
incidence of public sector employees; public sector employees tend to participate in 
the workforce longer and more educated; have white-collar type of occupation; tend 
to be union members; are less likely to be migrants from non-English speaking 
countries; are more likely to be from New South Wales or the Australian Capital 
Territory and Victoria, but are less likely to hold casual and part-time jobs. There is 
some evidence of gender differences. As expected, more females have casual or part-
time jobs. This is especially apparent among private sector workers. Also, more 
females are degree holders and with white-collar jobs than are their male counterparts 
irrespective of which sector they are employed. More female public sector employees 
are immigrants from non-English speaking countries.  
3.3 Econometric issues 
The estimation of a sectoral wage gap typically involves two complications resulting 
from two selection processes. One is the problem of sample selection arising from the 
work choice decision; the other is the selection into different sectors. If these two 
selection processes are determined by some unobserved factors that also affect wages, 
the public-private wage differentials estimated from models that do not account for 
these possibilities are likely to be biased. Our approach for accounting for sample 11 
 
selection in quantile regressions follows Buchinsky (1998, 2001). That is, we first 
estimate a single index selection equation using semi-parametric procedures (Frölich  
2006; Klein and Spady 1993); a power series of the predicted index is then included in 
the wage equation.
8 In our case we found two terms were sufficient to account for 
sample selection. However, we could not account for the potential endogenous sector 
selection of workers due to lack of valid identifying instruments.
9 Accordingly, the 
results reported here must be interpreted with caution. 
4. Results 
4.1 Single equation estimation  
Figure 3 presents the coefficient estimates and their 95 per cent confidence intervals 
for the public sector dummy variable from both the OLS model and quantile 
regressions. The quantile regressions are estimated at each 0.01 percentile point. For 
ease of reading, Table 1 lists the coefficient estimates for the public sector dummy at 
selected percentiles and also the estimates from OLS for males and females.
10  
The OLS estimates show that male workers in the public sector earn a wage that is 3 
per cent lower than their counterparts in the private sector, while for female workers 
in the public sector their wages are about 4 per cent higher than female workers in the 
private sector. The OLS results are comparable with other studies. Take the U.K. as 
an example, public servants enjoy a wage premium of 5 per cent on average relative 
to comparable private sector employees (e.g. Rees and Shah 1995).  It ranges from 2 
to 5 per cent for males; but much higher for females (15-18 per cent). 
                                                 
8 The results of the semi-parametric estimation of the selection equation are reported in Appendix 
Table 3, together with the probit estimates for comparision.  
9 Dustmann and van Soest (1998) and Melly (2005) use the father’s public sector employment as an 
instrument. Goddeeris (1998) use political activities in college and self-reported political orientation to 
control sample selection. Unfortunately, HILDA does not collect such information. Occupation of 
parents when the person was 14 years is available in the data. We attempted to use parental occupation 
as instruments, but found parental occupation was generally insignificant in explaining males’ sector 
choice, while for females mother’s, but not fathers’, occupation was sometimes significant. In addition, 
we are sceptical about the validity of parental occupation as instruments. Parental occupation is likely 
to be affected by unobserved ability which, in turns, is likely to be highly correlated between parents 
and their children. 
10 Coefficient estimates for other variables are not shown here but are obtainable on request from the 
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Figure 3: Coefficient estimates on public dummy by sex
 
 
Table 1: Estimates of public-private wage gap in a single equation model  
 Males    Females 
 Coef  s.e.    Coef  s.e. 
OLS   -0.0321**  0.0133   0.0387***  0.0095 
Quantile regression       
0.1    0.0529***  0.0143    0.0333**  0.0137 
0.2    0.0507***  0.0124    0.0517***  0.0107 
0.3    0.0293**  0.0117    0.0632***  0.0095 
0.4    0.0170  0.0126    0.0589***  0.0082 
0.5   -0.0052  0.0129    0.0553***  0.0089 
0.6   -0.0368***  0.0137    0.0615***  0.0089 
0.7   -0.0777***  0.0165    0.0578***  0.0098 
0.8   -0.0985***  0.0164    0.0461***  0.0123 
0.9    -0.1322***  0.0210   0.0199 0.0153 
 
 
The story is quite different from the quantile regression estimates. For males the 
sectoral effect exhibits a monotonic decrease across almost the entire conditional 
wage distribution. For the lower one third of the conditional wage distribution, a 
positive effect is found, while for the upper 60 per cent of the conditional wage 
distribution, the effect is found to be negative. The magnitude of the negative effect is 
fairly large at the upper end of the conditional wage distribution. For example, in the 
top 20 per cent of the wage distribution, the negative effect is about 10 per cent or 
more. The OLS estimate is close to the estimate at the 60
th quantile, but is far off 13 
 
those at the bottom and top ends of the conditional wage distribution. For females the 
quantile regression estimates are relatively stable and positive over almost the entire 
wage distribution and in the range of 3 to 6 per cent. The estimates at the very bottom 
and top ends of the conditional wage distribution are insignificant. Again, the OLS 
estimate for females provide misleading inference as to the effect at other parts of the 
conditional wage distribution. Using German data, Jürges (2002) also find that in 
contrast to males, female wage earners in the public sector enjoy a positive wage 
premium. A negative wage premium is only observed at very high quantiles. Poterba 
and Rueben (1994) estimate a single log wage equation with a public sector dummy 
using quantile regressions for the U.S.. They also report negative public sector wage 
premiums at the upper tail of the wage distribution, while a positive premium is 
evident at the lower end. 
4.2 Quantile regression decomposition 
The single equation estimation results must be interpreted with caution, because they 
rely on the assumption that the wage determination process is identical for both public 
and private sector workers. This assumption may be violated if being a public sector 
employee also affects the returns to factors such as education. To see whether the 
model should be estimated separately for each group of workers, we experimented 
through making interactions of each independent variable with the public sector 
dummy. If the interaction terms are jointly significant, the independent variables 
affect public and private sector workers differently. The test statistics are reported in 
appendix Table A2. The results in general reject the hypothesis that workers in both 
sectors are subject to the same wage determination process. Therefore, the sectoral 
wage effects estimated using the single equation model are likely to be misleading; 
separate wage determination equations for public and private sector and 
decomposition methods are required to provide a more reliable picture of the public-
private sectoral wage differentials.  
To generate the samples for decomposition purposes, we estimate models for 
quantiles at [0.001, 0.003... 0.997, 0.999] and at the median. There are 501 regressions 
for each gender and sector group and thus it is not possible to report all the estimation 
results.
11 In the followings we focus on the decomposition results. 
                                                 
11 Selected quantile regression results, together with OLS estimates, can be obtained from the authors. 14 
 
Using the procedure described in Section 2, we decompose the difference between the 
quantiles of the distribution into the components explained by the differences in inter-
sectoral distribution of characteristics (e.g. personal and job characteristics) and 
different returns to these characteristics. It is the latter component that can be 
interpreted as the sectoral effects, because otherwise there should not be any 
difference in the returns. For this reason the reported results focus on the gap due to 
return differences. 
Figure 3 shows the wage gap attributable to return differences at each 0.01 percentile 
point, together with bootstrapped 95 per cent confidence intervals. In bootstrapping 
the 95 per cent confidence intervals, 100 replications were used and the clustering of 
the observations resulting from the panel data was also taken into account. For 
comparison, the horizontal line in the figure shows the sectoral wage effect estimated 
using the OLS decomposition method. The OLS estimate is computed as ()
pp n x β β − , 
using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), where 
p x refers to the means of the public sector worker sample; 
p β  and 
n β  refer to the 
OLS coefficient estimates from public sector workers and private sector workers 
respectively. Again, for ease of reading Table 2 presents the results for selected 
quantiles. 
The OLS decomposition shows that for male workers the contribution of returns 
differences to the wage gap is -0.05, which is significant at the five per cent 
significance level, implying that male workers in the public sector earn 5 per cent less 
on average than a comparable worker in the private sector. This estimate is larger in 
size than that found in a single equation model. For females, the OLS decomposition 
shows that the sectoral wage effect is about 0.03, lower than that found in the single 
equation model. For both males and females our OLS decomposition results are 
different from Boland et al. (1998). They find that the entire observed wage gap can 
be attributed to the differences in observed individual and job characteristics. The 
differences of the results might not come as a surprise for at least two reasons. First, 
Borland et al. (1998) use data collected in 1993, about 10 years earlier than the data 
used in this study. In 1993 wage setting was very much controlled by the award 
system, but the data in this study covered the period when enterprise-bargaining is 
wide-spread. Second, the macroeconomic conditions are very different between the 
two periods. Year 1993 was the time when recession hits the bottom with an 15 
 
unemployment rate of over 12 per cent. The period studied here is characterised by a 
booming economy with an unemployment rate less than a half of the 1993 level. As a 
result, the relative wage structure between public and private sectors might have 
changed, provided that the two sectors have responded to the economic boom 
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Table 2: Decomposition of the public-private wage gap 
 Males    Females 
  Raw gap  Gap due to diff in returns    Raw gap  Gap due to diff in returns 
    Estimates  95% CI      Estimates  95% CI 
OLS 0.1483  -0.0493  (-0.0641,  -0.0344)    0.1917  0.0263  (0.0122,0.0404) 
Quantile Regression           
0.1  0.2125  0.0853  (0.0610, 0.1121)    0.1619  0.0455  (0.0287, 0.0713) 
0.2  0.2146  0.0701  (0.0502, 0.0927)    0.1716  0.0617  (0.0454, 0.0799) 
0.3  0.2196  0.0552  (0.0085, 0.0519)    0.2031  0.0679  (0.0519, 0.0874) 
0.4  0.2214  0.0327  (-0.0049, 0.0535)    0.2273  0.0698  (0.0495, 0.0908) 
0.5  0.2030  0.0010  (-0.0277, 0.0264)    0.2469  0.0659  (0.0458, 0.0909) 
0.6  0.1819  -0.0397  (-0.0695, -0.0141)    0.2454  0.0557  (0.0349, 0.0790) 
0.7  0.1380  -0.0950  (-0.1270, -0.0675)    0.2367  0.0384  (0.0166, 0.0598) 
0.8  0.0721  -0.1744  (-0.2091, -0.1423)    0.2115  0.0125  (-0.0106, 0.0369) 
0.9  -0.0235  -0.2922  (-0.3325, -0.2477)    0.1364  -0.0483  (-0.0851, -0.0132) 
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The quantile regression decomposition results show that the sectoral effects are 
positive for the quantiles from the bottom up to the 50
th quantile for male workers and 
up to the 82
nd quantile for females. The positive effects are significant at the 5 per cent 
significant level for the quantiles from the bottom up to the 41
st for males and for the 
quantiles from the 4
th to the 77
th for females. For males the significant positive effect 
decreases monotonically from 16 per cent at the bottom to about 3 at the 41
st quantile; 
for females the significant positive effect initially increases from 3 per cent at the 4
th 
quantile to about 7 per cent at the 40
th quantile and falls thereafter to about 2 per cent 
at the 77
th quantile. For males the negative effect becomes significant from the 58
th 
quantile onwards and the significant negative effect increases from 3 per cent to 47 
per cent. For females the negative effect becomes significant from the 89
th quantile 
onwards; the significant negative effect increases from about 4 per cent to about 18 
per cent. Similar effect patterns are found for German workers (Jürges 2002; Melly 
2004). Clearly, the estimates from the OLS model cannot reveal the variation of the 
sectoral effect across the wage distribution, as found from the quantile regression 
models. In particular, the opposite sectoral effects at the lower end and the upper end 
of the wage distribution cannot be inferred from the OLS models.  
Table 2 also shows that the part of wage gap due to differences in observed individual 
and job characteristic is substantial. The proportion of the observed wage gap 
attributable to the sectoral effect is relatively small. This suggests that public sector 
employees have individual and job characteristics that are more conducive to higher 
remuneration. In Table 2 the quantile where the largest proportion of the gap (40 per 
cent for males and 36 per cent for females) can be attributed to the sectoral effect is 
the 10
th and the 20
th quantiles for males and females respectively. This finding is in 
line with that of Melly (2005).  
Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2 and Table 2 with Table 1, we find that the patterns 
of the estimated effects are similar between the single equation and separate equation 
models, but the magnitude of the estimated effects differs. The estimates from the 
separate equation models are generally larger than that in the single equation models.  
5. Conclusion 
 
Using the first six waves of the HILDA survey, this paper employs both OLS and 
quantile regressions and a semi-parametric decomposition method to examine the 17 
 
sectoral wage gap at the mean and over the entire conditional wage distribution. 
Unlike earlier Australian studies, using OLS models, we found a significant negative 
sectoral effect for males and a significant positive effect for females after controlling 
for observed individual and job characteristics, although the size of the effect is small.  
Using quantile regressions, we found a significant wage premium for the public sector 
at the lower part of the conditional wage distribution and a significant wage penalty at 
the upper part of the distribution, a result similar to a number of international studies. 
The public wage premium at the lower end of the conditional wage distribution might 
be due to the more effective implementation of equal opportunity and anti-
discriminatory policies in the public sector, since the government may use public 
sector pay to achieve objectives such as equity and to be a ‘good’ employer (Bender 
and Elliot 1999). A commonly cited reason for public wage penalty at the upper end 
of the conditional wage distribution is public opposition to high pay for public 
servants (Katz and Kreuger 1991; Lucifora and Meurs 1999), while private sector is 
not subject to such opposition. This allows the private sector to use high pay to attract 
high-skilled workers. Higher private sector remuneration could also be compensating 
differentials that private sector employers use to reduce the turnover rate of high 
skilled employees and/or for less pleasant work environment. For example, some 
studies find that overall satisfaction in the public sector is higher than in the private 
sector (Gardner and Oswald 1999; Jürges 2001). Nation-wide skill shortage and the 
booming economy may be another reason for the much higher wages in private sector 
than in public sector at the upper end of the wage distribution. Bargain and Melly 
(2008) also find a positive effect of the economic upturn on private sector wages in 
France. They attribute the sectoral wage differential to the sensitivity of private sector 
wage (and the lack of sensitivity of the public sector) to macro shocks. The currently 
booming Australian economy is largely driven by rapid increases in export of raw 
material and commodities produced by private sector. The booming of the mining and 
related industries not only creates high demand for high-skilled workers, but also 
generates large revenue for the industries. This means that these private sector 
employers can afford to pay high wages to attract employees needed.  
It is not clear why female private sector employees are only paid more than their 
public sector counterparts at the very top end, whereas male private employees are 
rewarded higher than their public sector counterparts for a larger part of the wage 18 
 
distribution. One possible explanation is that labour market discrimination against 
women is more widespread in the private sector than in the public sector, affecting 
most except a few women at the very top end. The alternative explanation could be 
that the distributional differences of men and women across industries in the private 
sector may lead to different patterns of the sectoral wage effect between men and 
women if more men are in high-pay industries. Finally, different unobservables 
between men and women could also be an attributing factor. For instance, relative to 
men, women in general may not be good at bargaining for themselves (Babcock and 
Lashever 2003). Only the few female executives who have acquired the bargaining 
skills gain higher pays as the specific salary levels in the private sector are more likely 
to be determined by negotiation. The exact reasons for the difference of the sectoral 
wage effects between males and females require further investigation. 
The decomposition results indicate that differences in observed characteristic explain 
a substantial proportion of the overall public-private sector wage gap. The sectoral 
effect only accounts for a relatively small proportion with its impact mostly confined 
to the lowest end of the conditional wage distribution. In other words, public sector 
employees have characteristics that are more conducive to higher remuneration.  
This study has limitations. First, due to the data constraint the problem of selection 
into different sectors could not be dealt with here. If wages and selection into a 
particular sector are affected by some correlated unobservables, the estimates reported 
here might be biased. By not allowing endogenous sector choices, we may 
underestimate the mean premium as shown by Melly (2005). Second, the quantile 
regression results rely on the assumption that the covariates, particular sectoral status, 
are not related to the mean of the unobservables. The estimated sectoral wage effects 
would be biased if this assumption does not hold. Third, as our data have no 
information on work effort (often lower in the public sector) and non-wage benefits 
(often higher in the public sector), our results are likely to underestimate the true 
public sector premium. Fourth, Chatterji et al. (2007) find that workplace 
characteristics such as presence of performance related pay, company pension 
schemes and family-friendly employment practices (eg. paternity leave and maternity 
leave with pay) are important in explaining the public-private wage gap. Due to data 
availability, we could not include job related characteristics other than workplace size. 
Finally, we do not distinguish public sector employees employed by the federal 19 
 
government from those employed by the state or local governments. Large wage 
differences could exist between different levels of government employees (Poterba 






Table A1: Summary statistics of the samples 
 Male  Female 
  Public Private  All  Public Private  All 
  Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Hourly  wages  23.816 10.628 21.576 17.234 22.153 15.830 21.229 10.121 17.831 10.642 19.035 10.585 
Married  0.820 0.384 0.742 0.438 0.762 0.426 0.718 0.450 0.714 0.452 0.715 0.451 
Degree  0.431 0.495 0.221 0.415 0.275 0.447 0.495 0.500 0.237 0.425 0.328 0.470 
Other post-school 
qualification  0.357 0.479 0.427 0.495 0.409 0.492 0.236 0.424 0.277 0.448 0.262 0.440 
Year  12  0.088 0.284 0.118 0.323 0.111 0.314 0.098 0.297 0.165 0.371 0.141 0.348 
Life-time  employment  24.257 10.170 21.812 10.874 22.441  10.750  20.409 8.933 18.721 9.552 19.319 9.372 
Life-time employment 
square  691.826 507.308 593.999 531.429 619.176 527.048 496.310 393.958 441.706 409.431 461.064 404.843 
Indigenous  0.015 0.123 0.009 0.093 0.010 0.101 0.023 0.148 0.009 0.095 0.014 0.117 
Immigrants from Eng-
speaking  country  0.115 0.319 0.118 0.323 0.118 0.322 0.094 0.292 0.113 0.317 0.106 0.308 
Immigrants from non-Eng 
speaking  country  0.087 0.282 0.128 0.335 0.118 0.322 0.094 0.292 0.132 0.339 0.119 0.323 
NSW/ACT  0.371 0.483 0.304 0.460 0.321 0.467 0.339 0.473 0.320 0.466 0.327 0.469 
VIC  0.226 0.418 0.267 0.442 0.256 0.437 0.234 0.424 0.266 0.442 0.255 0.436 
QLD  0.200 0.400 0.208 0.406 0.206 0.404 0.200 0.400 0.209 0.407 0.206 0.404 
SA  0.081 0.272 0.085 0.279 0.084 0.277 0.085 0.279 0.084 0.278 0.085 0.279 
WA/NT  0.100 0.300 0.111 0.314 0.108 0.310 0.099 0.299 0.093 0.290 0.095 0.293 
TAS  0.022 0.147 0.026 0.159 0.025 0.156 0.042 0.201 0.027 0.163 0.033 0.178 
Capital  city  0.595 0.491 0.650 0.477 0.636 0.481 0.586 0.493 0.646 0.478 0.625 0.484 
Part-time  0.081 0.273 0.081 0.273 0.081 0.273 0.376 0.484 0.448 0.497 0.422 0.494 
Casual  0.066 0.247 0.155 0.362 0.132 0.339 0.123 0.328 0.293 0.455 0.233 0.423 
Part-time  &  casual  0.040 0.196 0.059 0.236 0.054 0.226 0.107 0.309 0.237 0.425 0.191 0.393 
White  collar  workers  0.466 0.499 0.275 0.447 0.324 0.468 0.564 0.496 0.252 0.434 0.363 0.481 
Other white collar 
workers  0.357 0.479 0.282 0.450 0.301 0.459 0.404 0.491 0.615 0.487 0.540 0.498 
Blue  collar  workers  0.177 0.382 0.442 0.497 0.374 0.484 0.032 0.177 0.133 0.340 0.097 0.297 21 
 
Having  health  conditions 0.176 0.381 0.149 0.356 0.156 0.363 0.151 0.358 0.140 0.347 0.144 0.351 
Firm  size  <20  0.188 0.391 0.367 0.482 0.321 0.467 0.176 0.381 0.452 0.498 0.354 0.478 
firm  size  20-99  0.306 0.461 0.311 0.463 0.310 0.462 0.372 0.484 0.279 0.448 0.312 0.463 
Firm  size  100-199  0.139 0.346 0.109 0.312 0.117 0.321 0.101 0.301 0.099 0.299 0.100 0.300 
Firm  size  200-499  0.130 0.336 0.106 0.307 0.112 0.315 0.108 0.311 0.089 0.285 0.096 0.294 
Firm  size  500+  0.230 0.421 0.101 0.302 0.134 0.341 0.228 0.420 0.070 0.255 0.126 0.332 
Firm  size  unknown  0.007 0.086 0.006 0.079 0.007 0.081 0.014 0.117 0.011 0.104 0.012 0.109 
Union  workers  0.601 0.490 0.264 0.441 0.351 0.477 0.540 0.498 0.205 0.404 0.324 0.468 
Wave  2  0.170 0.376 0.169 0.375 0.170 0.375 0.164 0.370 0.166 0.372 0.165 0.372 
Wave  3  0.168 0.374 0.166 0.372 0.166 0.372 0.169 0.374 0.162 0.369 0.165 0.371 
Wave  4  0.164 0.370 0.159 0.365 0.160 0.367 0.159 0.365 0.158 0.365 0.158 0.365 
Wave  5  0.163 0.370 0.163 0.370 0.163 0.370 0.166 0.372 0.165 0.371 0.165 0.372 
Wave  6  0.160 0.367 0.166 0.372 0.165 0.371 0.170 0.375 0.171 0.376 0.170 0.376 
Selection  index  0.369 0.102 0.377 0.095 0.375 0.097 0.306 0.101 0.336 0.087 0.326 0.093 
Selection  index  square  0.146 0.064 0.151 0.062 0.150 0.063 0.104 0.055 0.121 0.054 0.115 0.055 
              
No.  of  observations  3663 10570  14233 5058  9209 14267  
 
Table A2: F-statistics on the joint significance of the interaction variables between 
public status dummy and other independent variables 
  10%  20%  30%  40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%  OLS 
Males 5.85***  5.11***  7.57***  10.61***10.55*** 13.02*** 15.94*** 14.61*** 10.28*** 5.30***
Females 1.24  2.72***  3.19***  4.09*** 5.84*** 6.45*** 5.02*** 5.99***  5.31***  2.54***




Table A3: Probit and Semi-parametric estimations of the selection equation 
 Males  Females 
 Probit  Semi-parametric  Probit   Semi-parametric 
 Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef. S.E.    Coef.  S.E. 
Age  -0.6432  0.0772 -0.7918 0.2827 -0.5758 0.0533    -0.8132  0.2646 
Age  square  -0.2461  0.0211 -0.2520 0.0885 -0.0577 0.0162    -0.0666  0.0301 
Married  0.3626  0.0321 0.3632 0.1204 0.0234 0.0233    0.0239  0.0339 
Degree  1.0252  0.0418 1.1271 0.3813 0.7464 0.0282    0.9506  0.2882 
Other post-school 
qualification  0.2911  0.0313 0.2671 0.0963 0.2816 0.0257    0.3727  0.1188 
Year  12  0.4506  0.0478 0.4383 0.1565 0.2627 0.0313    0.3414  0.1128 
Life-time 
employment  1.167  0.0724 1.3155 0.4528 1.5187 0.0425    2.0306  0.6211 
Life-time 
employment square  0.032  0.014  0.0323  0.0191 -0.1808  0.0099    -0.2391  0.0739 
Immigrants from 
Eng-speaking country 0.0066  0.0412 0.0432  0.0478 -0.1138  0.0334    -0.1477  0.0653 
Immigrants from non-
Eng speaking country -0.1688  0.0396 -0.1367  0.0623 -0.3042  0.0298    -0.3762  0.1185 
VIC -0.0101  0.0357 -0.0496  0.0429 0.0094  0.0269    0.0144  0.0386 
QLD  -0.0819  0.0374 -0.0634 0.0468 -0.0918 0.0284    -0.1167  0.0525 
SA  -0.1369  0.0483 -0.1836 0.0812 -0.1013 0.0374    -0.1383  0.0669 
WA/NT 0.0488  0.0482 0.0519  0.0577 -0.1729  0.0358    -0.2324  0.0868 
TAS -0.1569  0.0748 -0.1526  0.0940 0.1063  0.0601    0.1551  0.0993 
Capital  city  0.2273  0.0288 0.2668 0.0946 0.0287 0.0218    0.0363  0.0322 
Having health 
conditions  -0.8843  0.0277 -0.8258 0.2810 -0.6761 0.0243    -0.8818  0.2693 
Have children under 5 
years  -0.0408  0.0528 -0.0433 0.0642 -0.9941 0.0324    -1.2968  0.3991 
Have children 5-14 
years 0.096  0.0536 0.1019  0.0712 -0.0103  0.033    -0.0280  0.0484 
Number  of  children -0.0868  0.0246 -0.1024 0.0438 -0.1352 0.0159    -0.1712  0.0571 
Aged 55 or over  -0.3283  0.0658 -0.2948  0.1232 -0.2795  0.0539    -0.3697  0.1378 
Wave 2  0.0662  0.0422 0.0643  0.0507 -0.0105  0.0332    0.0093  0.0477 
Wave  3  0.2091  0.0431 0.2247 0.0887 0.0582 0.0335    0.0865  0.0541 
Wave 4  0.2644  0.0443 0.2954  0.1103 0.065  0.034    0.0894  0.0549 
Wave  5  0.3516  0.0449 0.3710 0.1332 0.1563 0.0342    0.2124  0.0787 
Wave  6  0.3657  0.0451 0.3984 0.1412 0.1976 0.0343    0.2616  0.0907 
Constant -0.199  0.0688 .  .  -0.001  0.0522    .  . 
Non-labour  income  -1  . -1  . -1  .  . -1 . 
Note: For identification the constant term cannot be included in the semi-parametric estimation and the 
coefficient on one of the continuous variables has to be normalised to be one. Here we normalised the 
coefficient on non-labour income to be -1. For comparison, we also normalised the coefficient of non-
labour income to be -1 in the probit model.  
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